

York on Teller, Oct 82

He also

a zealot, a messiah
say and do anything
He knows the truth, and

I won't ~~debate~~ ^{argue} with him
I won't speak on the same platform


so dis...
unfair

- Now went just around the corner
 - it will save us
- He knows + infuriating the.

^{seems}
In 1957 when she was moving toward a CTB,
Strauss/Jackson a
clean bomb was just around the corner

The doubt occurred but didn't save us...
Notion that tech deal will solve the problem

In 1963 testified us. CTB - will foreclose



U #

ABM

WW

on solving an atmospheric test box, with which



Van Clava

like claiming to be the inventor
electric chair

Nuclear growth of American program

SC

Hilfer - American Scientists & Nuclear Policy 1960

u

Reliability testing

Then as a liquor

ex-CIA types

consensus that

Tom Riedel

195

Comfy-matched set of militarily

Oct 31, ⁽¹²⁾ 1958


6 mos earlier, K said Supreme Court had
passed a resolution

Sputnik finally moved the toward test box
Bible, Wilson, ... (Kisty)

Test
On monitors, 1958...



York, started out dubious to hostile



He agreed to one year; at end, said,
14 mos

Dec. 1959

He said, "No longer bound, but will not test
without notice."

K said: "No longer bound, but will not without West."
— then French began testing 1960 K — "It's testing."

"Not a case of perjury" — but widely regarded

Documents on Desamant, ^{till 1961/62} State (before ACDA)

Our rat. sec. has gotten steadily worse —

It would have had a force — but much
less than

Very interesting round technology

Weakness our security

- What SU can do without our help to stop it
- US over-reliance on weapons is undermining the alliance

Fix alliance -

Non-nuc weapons

US inaction on giving nucs #1 role is weakening alliance

(By Michael Howard:

1188 meeting in Amsterdam)

all theories that govern relationships & deployments reflect

Now that

Arguments about the precise nature of that policy are misleading

Important fact that sup. is gone - because
SU exploited some technology, later...

'That's wrong - we did

, Koz, Jellies

If could say how have created
Bob Buckheim, ^{US Ambassador} on member of Standing Committee Con.
on SACT-I has testified that how have lined up
to the agreement -

WN

Pres. FIAB

I feel quite confident that

no MIRV - good

no window

big, bulky missile

now, so much overkill on both sides that you

start about a

I'm pretty pessimistic about how

No bottleneck

a pair of eyes

Failure to try to avoid development, of agreement,
inspection, test-ban [still not, and the weapon!]
A; (H),

Teller-Roth: new rule and for EU

(Kikewie, his ABM? vs. reduced nuclear force?

Presumably attack on any ABM?

Also - we have it first → US ES!

Delta 294-95-97

Fear of public, "bully" → fear of arms
agreements.

1/6 START - not a stop to arms race

(Obstacle to stop is not - yet - verification
of SU attitude - it is Pres' determination to
have new weapons - ES - despite? - SU intention
~~even~~

(ABM ~~is~~ carefully SALT I -
is part of this!)

4) - Promptness US & SU

5) - COW

2) - continued race

6) - proof.

3) - rise of US EU...

SU intention to agree and keep agreement

(not risk US detection of cheating) : now,

not 3-4 years from now! (or, say, 7 years ago: 1975,

on basis of MIRV, after 5 years of US of MIRV buildup:

or perhaps, ~~since~~ in 1970, after US MIRV test. Or 1964. [1967-68]

(1957?)

US public ^I believe in deterrence; will not accept
one-sided race, highly and; concern on ME

(But not commitment of FU, or in this War, or
and for Sup.)

SV never have protected this super!

Pre-war idea: If you have more, better, newer
weapons, you are safe against opponent's attack.
With nukes — his small, residual force can destroy
you, 1st or 2d.

Barlin — if you can count on destroying most
of opponent's weapons, you are safe. Now...

Myths? [NCU/NFS
New weapons

"Trust in force": with not to build new weapons?
not to use new weapons?

to control them? (see control!)

to back down

(to be "responsive, cautious, in control"
not to go to COW)

Self-interest

— (if any are what some shines to entire:

not to use their own
FU/FS capabilities!

No agreement is possible: not to share one tech.

|| Those who say, "how will build all the can, with or without agreement"
— were wrong ^{about} for 20 years: how didn't build up one without agreement!

No experts in the room on improving US security
though our competition — that is what we've had,
without question

(there to some) and our sec. is lower. ...e.g. than
1957-58, or 1961-62-63... or 1967-68...

USMC ~~into~~: plus for Haifa / Alexandria

Might have been a bad trade - as, Israeli.

But if ~~it~~ no Man & know well have wanted
to be protected by us.

- Commandant ... (Sharp? Pate?)

3 days to sacrifice to avoid ... Aaron has. agree...

- I assumed Pres agreed, but...

in fact: every time US troops were surrounded...

....

My comm ~~was~~ ^{wasn't} based on trust
of the Russians. In fact, what I thought of myself
as doing was fighting ~~Russians~~ ^{against} ~~covertly~~ ^{covertly} Russians, & the
Comm allies. — when I went to VN, it was with
the hope of beating Coms decisively, for ever.

Nothing I have heard since, ~~no~~ ^{nor} ~~likewise~~ evidence
of SC behavior - has ^{not} ~~given~~ ^{me} that. I have heard
to have ~~also~~ ^(saw) ~~agreed~~ ^{that} in the ^(present) ~~organizational~~ ^{judgments}
of one of ~~our~~ ^{the} ~~senior~~ ^{senior} officials or in the policies of which I
~~had~~ ^{was} ~~part~~ ^{part} - I have more ^{that} the work
I worked for & in the Expe. board in the wisdom of our
Congress, public, & our pol. process, & in the value of ~~discussion~~
discussion of an informal public that ~~expressed~~ ^{was} to
examine its ~~disaster~~ ^{power} ~~power~~ ^{sovereignty} in a new system -
so I'm glad to see them ~~begin~~ ^{begin} & take part.

Presidential
~~It~~ does confirm that the policies we have
 prepared for a generation — ^{ever since the laws began to approach being ~~settled~~} which have not, ^{a US effort} included
 the proposal before us today, ^{to seek a ~~total~~}
 a ^{mutual} verifiable halt to the ^{number} ^{build-ups} ~~armaments~~ on both sides —
 an immediate
 an adequate or best suited to insure our safety
 in a world of Russia as the one, or of US officials
 allies as the one, or of other governments & major factors
 as the one. It is indeed a dangerous world — and our
 policies ^{may} ~~and~~ ^{be} ~~making~~ ^{unduly} it more dangerous.

Opponents of the proposal are not less trusting of
SU than I am — in a variety of ways, they seem to be
more trusting, ^{or complacent,} to the point of recklessness.

Sentiment... ^{believe} that SU will quit, when seen broken.

- will refrain from ~~blatantly~~ ^{intending} weapons
leaving US with monopoly.

I wish they would — we are both well
off with both sides having hair-trigger,
destroying, vulnerable weapons...

But I don't count on them to forgo them.

I suspect that most of their opponents, outside the tree,
realize that SU will get these weapons — ^{after} we do, and
they will not allow us to complete testing of P/CM, N, D-5, MX
and these accept France.

3-5 years

~~If that's what we expect them to do~~

Another explanation: SU is rational, prudent, cautious
^{AND WILL ALWAYS BACK DOWN BEFORE SUPERIOR STRENGTH.}
in control, long-run thinking: they can be trusted to

possess these weapons, and even to use them — to
threaten, to prompt, to launch on false alarm, to launch
accidentally, to lose control to a dissident faction or
ally — just so long as we have none, we are stronger,
etc. If that's the case with... so long as we have the first,
greater number. I don't. I don't want them to have... (ABM!)

^{No} Pres. has proposed a plan to stop them. ^{a unilateral} The French,
if accepted by SU, and unilateral, would. Might the SU accept

and help it? It would have great incentive to do so —
to ~~prevent~~ as the only way to prevent our getting
— ABM; to be caught cheating would be to
end forever the prospects of restoring US programs.

Will they see the self-interest this way? We can't
find out unless we ~~propose~~ ^{propose} are willing to explore.
And right now, ^{obstacle to that move for a while} ~~there is~~ not SU willingness to consider
ceasing — whether on-site or otherwise — nor SU willingness to stop,
but on President's willingness to draw it —
his determination to have the next round of weapons,
even at the cost of assuring SU recognition.

We don't have much time to change this.
If P/CM proceed — Freezer will be based on...
for a while — our US weapons — prolif. —

Those who oppose must. don't wait responses for the
SU weapons that will follow — they are sure those SU
weapons are unavoidable: soon will not, ^{you} will not happen. In fact
they are certain of this — so need to test it. Should we but on
his & future they are right? If so, in any case, the same
people who said no agreement would stop SU from further exp.;
on missile exp — hence, no CTB. The assumption, then as now, was
that SU would omit no effort — and could not to achieve exp.

^{etc.}
"Just the judgments & policies of the past — they got us
here —" We must do better in those policies are
at best suspicious — we must explore investigate other possibilities
that alone provide a possible lead to some soon and
That is why your kindness is so necessary — don't leave it
to RAND, Simmons, DOD, the Adm. Force, Rockwell Int., ^{engineers} — or any the Pres

central not

I can't say the faith was utterly irrefragable —
I believed it. But it was wrong — for ~~the~~ years
of the first year by year for ~~many~~ about 20 years.

But for the ~~the~~ ~~the~~ religion field Board the loss
failed to yield what they could have, in value - a gift! So the judge
that ~~was~~ ~~was~~ was about ~~and~~ ~~and~~ was wrong.

[Being SU - "L-r things" - are wildly reckless or over-
confident w/ + L-r! along with, cautious in S-r!
(except, in determinal deval / test process, where they
stimulate us!)]

Perhaps it is right, now — that the laws, who have
entirely ~~fully~~ begun and done ~~actually~~ now ordered at great
cost, partly — are now determined to achieve ~~partly~~, ^{superiority}
~~cannot~~ will not see any self-interest in restricting
US progress by ^a virtual agreement which they have made ~~to~~
that restricts them as well. But their claim to certainly
on this — precluding y and to find out — deserves
no confidence whatever.

Now does the judgment that safety — is a world
of unstrained and new, proof, > 50,000 words, his
is a new tech gadget — ABM, N-bale (same reason
for avoiding CTB — "new generation")

1957-58 as today - like MIRV in 1968. The cost of
 putting these uses ... 1400 SU missiles, 5000 warheads.
 (We cannot afford such expense - if it can be avoided.

We cannot stake our future blindly on the
judgment that it cannot be avoided ^{judgment} by those
whose whole careers ^{+ sense of purpose} have rested on the prospect
of a endless, 2-sided arms competition.

We must find out if we can do ^{still} better by our (now)
grandchildren than we have done ^{so far} for our children

~~Unless~~ the Pres will not do this unless we tell
him forcefully to do so. I hope this Committee will
add its voice to this effort.